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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann §78A-4-103(2)(h) because
this case involves an appeal from a final order of a District Court in a domestic relations
matter.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Did the trial court err when it failed to bifurcate the hearing on Ms. Doyle's
Petition to Modify, receiving evidence as to the child's best interests prior to determining
whether there had been a substantial change of circumstances?
Standard of Review: Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. Sill v. Hart,
2007 UT 45, ¶5, 162 P.3.d 1099. Utah Code Annotated §30-3-10.4 states that a custody
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order should not be modified unless there has been a material and substantial change in
circumstances. In an action to modify a custody order issued on the merits, a trial court is
required to make a finding of materially changed circumstances before it can consider
evidence as to the best interests of the child. Hogge v. Hogge 649 P.2d 51, 54 (Utah,
1982). Failure to bifurcate the evidence of changed circumstances and best interest of the
child is reversible error. Fullmer v. Fullmer 761 P.2d 942, 946 (Utah App. 1988).
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved for appeal when Mr. Doyle moved
the trial court for a bifurcated proceeding. (See, Record, at pp. 1508-16.) Mr. Doyle
objected to the trial court's allowance of evidence addressing the child's best interests
before a finding of changed circumstances had occurred (See, Judge Lindberg's Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, attached hereto as Exhibit A, at ¶¶ 1-2; see also,
Transcript of Bench Trial Volume I of II, dated October 2 & 3, 2007 (Record at p. 2044)
(hereinafter "Transcript Vol. I"), at pp. 1-8). Mr. Doyle also moved for a new trial due to
the trial court's failure to bifurcate. (See, Record, at pp. 1508-16.)
2.
	
Did the trial court err when it modified a custody decree which had been
issued following a bench trial where the court received evidence from both sides when
there was no material change in circumstances affecting the custodial parent's
relationship with the minor child?
Standard of Review: The standard of review for a custody determination is abuse
of discretion. Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P.2d 624 (Utah, 1987). It is an abuse of discretion
for a trial court to modify a custody order when there has not been a material change in
circumstances affecting the parenting abilities of a custodial parent. See, Hogge v. Hogge
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649 P.2d 51, 54 (Utah, 1982); Becker v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah, 1984); Fullmer
v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942, 946 (Utah App., 1988).
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved for appeal when Mr. Doyle
opposed the Petition to Modify Custody at trial and timely filed his Notice of Appeal.
(See, Record, at p. 2035).
3.
	
Was it an error for the trial court to modify a child support order, where
neither party appealed from the child support order, where neither party specifically
petitioned the Court for a modification of the child support order, and where the child
support order was not in error and was legally sound?
Standard of Review: The standard of review for a question of law is for
correctness. Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, ¶5, 162 P.3d 1099. It is incorrect for a court to
modify an existing child support order that has not been appealed, that has not been
petitioned for according to a substantial change in circumstance, and that was not made in
error. See, Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 946 (one district court judge cannot overrule
another district court judge of equal authority); Utah Code Ann. § 78b-12-210(9) (stating
that the court shall consider a modification of child support when a party petitions for
such modification based on a substantial change of circumstance); Utah Code Ann. § 30-
3-5(1) (giving the trial court authority to include equitable orders regarding support in a
divorce decree).
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved for appeal when Mr. Doyle timely
filed his Notice of Appeal. (See, Record, at pp. 1998-99.)
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(1) provides, in relevant part:
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and
parties.
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-10.4 provides, in relevant part:
(1) On the motion of one or both of the parents, or the joint legal
custodians if they are not the parents, the court may, after a hearing, modify
an order that established custody if:
(a) the circumstances of the child or one or both custodians have
materially and substantially changed since the entry of the order to
be modified; and
(b) a modification of the terms and conditions of the order would
be an improvement for and in the best interest of the child.
Utah Code Annotated § 78b-12-203(8) provides, in relevant part:
(8)(a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a minor child who is
the subject of a child support award nor benefits to a minor child in the
child's own right such as Supplemental Security Income.
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a
parent shall be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation
of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered as
income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case.
Utah Code Annotated § 78b-12-210(9) provides, in relevant part:
(9)(a) A parent, legal guardian, or the office may at any time petition the
court to adjust the amount of a child support order if there has been a
substantial change in circumstances. A change in the base combined child
support obligation table set forth in Section 78B-12-301 is not a substantial
change in circumstances for the purposes of this Subsection (9).
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(b) For purposes of this Subsection (9), a substantial change in
circumstances may include:
(i) material changes in custody;
(ii) material changes in the relative wealth or assets of the parties;
(iii) material changes of 30% or more in the income of a parent;
(iv) material changes in the employment potential and ability of a
parent to earn;
(v) material changes in the medical needs of the child; or
(vi) material changes in the legal responsibilities of either parent for
the support of others.
(c) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (9)(a), the court shall, taking
into account the best interests of the child:
(i) determine whether a substantial change has occurred;
(ii) if a substantial change has occurred, determine whether the
change results in a difference of 15% or more between the payor's
ordered support amount and the payor's support amount that would
be required under the guidelines; and
(iii) adjust the payor's ordered support amount to that which is
provided for in the guidelines if:
(A) there - is a difference of 15% or more; and
(B) the difference is not of a temporary nature.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.
	
NATURE OF THE CASE
After a two day bench trial in December, 2004, Judge Frank Noel of the Third
District Court, awarded custody of the parties' minor child, Hyrum, then age 8, to Mr.
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Doug Doyle. On October 11, 2005, Ms. Robin Doyle filed a Verified Petition for
Modification of the original Decree of Divorce.
After trial on Ms. Doyle's Petition for Modification, Judge Denise Lindberg
awarded sole legal custody to Ms. Doyle, and parent-time to Mr. Doyle. On March 19,
2008, the Court signed an Interim Order of Modification, awarding sole care, custody,
and control of Hyrum, to Ms. Doyle, and awarding Mr. Doyle parent-time. (See, Record,
at pp. 1796-97.)
On or about April 2, 2008, Mr. Doyle filed a timely Motion for New Trial,
pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (See, id., at pp. 1824-25.) The
Court issued a Minute Entry and Order denying Mr. Doyle's Motion for New Trial on
May 8, 2008. (See, id., at pp. 1958-61.) The Court subsequently entered an Order of
Modification on July 23, 2008. (See, id., at pp. 2013-27.)
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prior to the original divorce trial, Ms. Doyle took the parties' only son, Hyrum, to
Colorado on June 1, 2003. When she had not returned by June 9, 2003, Mr. Doyle filed a
Divorce Petition in the Third District Court. (See, Record, at pp. 1-6). Mr. Doyle was
awarded temporary custody by the Commissioner on June 14, 2003. When Ms. Doyle
failed to submit to the temporary custody order and after nine months Mr. Doyle obtained
custody of Hyrum with the assistance of local Colorado law enforcement on March 2,
2004. (R. 31-42; 325-329).
On December 13 and 14, 2004, Judge Frank Noel held a two day bench trial on the
issues of custody, visitation, spousal support, and division of property. (See, id., at pp.
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569-72). Following the December 2004 trial, the court awarded Mr. Doyle sole legal and
physical custody of Hyrum Doyle, in its Decree of Divorce dated February 28, 2005.
(See, Decree of Divorce, attached hereto as Exhibit B, at ¶ 2.)
At the time of entry of the Decree of Divorce, Ms. Doyle lived in Colorado. (See,
Transcript Vol. I, at p. 23.) The Decree of Divorce provided that, "In the event [Ms.
Doyle] relocates to the Salt Lake Valley, the parties will have joint legal and physical
custody and shall share time equally on alternating weeks and on holidays as per standard
schedule." (See, Decree of Divorce, Exh. B, at ¶ 2.) On May 9, 2005, Ms. Doyle
returned to the Salt Lake Valley, triggering the automatic change of custody provision in
the Decree of Divorce. (See, Transcript Vol. I, at 26.) On May 27, 2005, Mr. Doyle filed
a Motion for Relief from Judgment regarding the Decree of Divorce, requesting, among
other things, that the provision in the Decree for automatic change of custody be stricken.
(See, Record, at pp. 748-58.) At a hearing on August 12, 2005, the court granted Mr.
Doyle's Motion for Relief. (See, id., at p. 808). The Order on Motion for Relief from
Judgment was filed on January 11, 2006. (See, id., at p. 913-15.) Neither party appealed
from either the original Divorce Decree or the Order on Motion for Relief from
Judgment.
On October 11, 2005, Ms. Doyle filed a Verified Petition for Modification,
seeking to modify Judge Noel's custody order. (See, id., at pp. 865-69.)
The court granted Mr. Doyle's unopposed Motion for Bifurcated Hearing on
September 19, 2007, specifically stating that "judicial economy is best served by having
the material change issue presented first, but the parties should be prepared to
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immediately proceed to presentation of the substantive case if the Court determines the
threshold issue has been satisfied." (See, id., at 1600-02.) The two-day bench trial
commenced, as scheduled, on October 2 and 3, 2007. (See, id., at pp. 1642-43, 1648-49.)
At trial the court allowed Ms. Doyle, over Mr. Doyle's objection, to present
concurrent evidence on both the issue of whether a material and substantial change in
circumstances had occurred and the issue of whether a change in custody was in the best
interests of the child. (See, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Exh. A, at pp. 1-2;
see also, Transcript Vol. I, at pp. 1-8.)
The court stated that the reason for allowing evidence touching upon changed
circumstances and best interests at the same time was that it is "unreasonable to expect"
certain witnesses "who [are] very busy...to come in and testify twice at different points in
the proceedings..." (See, Transcript Vol. I, at pp. 1-8.) Judge Lindberg then stated,
"You will have to trust me to consider those matters correctly.... But at this point I am
going to receive the testimony." (See, id.) Accordingly, the trial court heard evidence on
whether a change in custody would be in the best interests of Hyrum before the Court
ruled on whether there was in fact a change in circumstances underpinning the original
divorce decree.
At trial, Ms. Doyle used the entire first day of trial, and much of the the morning
of the second day of trial presenting her case on all issues; consequently, Mr. Doyle was
unable to present any evidence until after the mid-morning break of the second day of
trial. (See, Transcript of Bench Trial, Volume II of II, dated October 2 & 3, 2007
(Record at p. 2045) (hereinafter "Transcript Vol. II"), at p. 313.)
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However, before Mr. Doyle could put on any evidence, Judge Lindberg ruled from
the bench that the Court had indeed found a material change of circumstances. (See, id.,
at pp. 254-63). Mr. Doyle objected to the Court's ruling from the bench, and orally
moved for a mistrial because Mr. Doyle had not been permitted to put on evidence of the
lack of a change in circumstances. (See, id., at pp. 260-61.)
The Court responded that the parties may treat her determination as "preliminary,"
(see, id.), denied the Motion for Mistrial and reopened evidence. On May 7, 2008, the
Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (See, Record, at pp. 1937-
57.) The Court concluded that Ms. Doyle had proven, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that a substantial and material change in circumstances occurred, justifying a
modification of custody in the case. (See, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Exh.
A, at ¶ 40.) The Court further found that Hyrum's best interests were met by granting
Ms. Doyle sole legal and physical custody. (See, id., at ¶ 41.) Mr. Doyle filed a timely
Notice of Appeal on June 9, 2008 following denial of the Motion for New Trial. (See,
Record, at pp. 1998-99.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Trial Court erred by failing to bifurcate the proceedings on Ms. Doyle's
Petition for Modification when it admitted evidence as to Hyrum's best interests prior to
finding that a substantial and material change in circumstances had occurred. The Trial
Court's admission of best interests evidence prior to finding a substantial change in
circumstances directly contradicts the rule established by the Utah Supreme Court in
Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah, 1982), for cases which have been decided after a full
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trial. By failing to bifurcate, the Trial Court undermined the policy favoring the stability
of previously adjudicated child custody orders. The Trial Court's failure to bifurcate,
moreover, denied Mr. Doyle a fair trial because the trial court did not allow Mr. Doyle
sufficient time to put on his evidence.
If this court were to determine that the procedural errors in this case were
insufficient to warrant a reversal of the court's decision, Mr. Doyle argues that on the
merits, there were insufficient findings of fact to support a ruling that there had been a
substantial change in circumstances regarding the custodial relationship between Mr.
Doyle and Hyrum. Specifically, the changes noted by the court were the result of a
substantial change in the custodial relationship between Hyrum and Mr. Doyle. Further,
there was no evidence from which the court could determine that such changes were due
to Mr. Doyle's failed parenting or due to a change in his relationship with Hyrum. The
undisputed evidence proved that Ms. Doyle had been allowed all of her parent time and
that Mr. Doyle had cooperated to have her care for Hyrum when Mr. Doyle was working
during his own parent time.
Finally, the Trial Court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that Judge
Hironas' January 11, 2006 Order on Motion for Relief from Judgment constituted a
substantial change in circumstances because a ruling of the court cannot be considered a
fact in determining a change in circumstances. Because there has been no material
change in circumstances, it is in Hyrum's best interest to remain in the care of his father,
Mr. Doyle.
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ARGUMENT
I.
	
FAILURE TO HOLD BIFURCATED HEARING
The trial court failed to bifurcate the hearing on Ms. Doyle's Petition to Modify
when it allowed Ms. Doyle to present evidence on Hyrum's best interests before
determining the issue of whether a substantial change had occurred since the entry of the
original Decree of Divorce. By failing to properly bifurcate this matter, the trial court
diverged from clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Furthermore, the trial
court's failure to bifurcate prejudiced Mr. Doyle. Accordingly, this Court should reverse
the trial court's decision to modify custody and vacate its Order of Modification.
A.
	
The trial court erred by admitting evidence concerning Hyrum's best
interests before determining the issue of substantial change.
A petition for divorce can be modified upon a hearing by the court to determine:
(1) whether the circumstances of the child or the custodian(s) has materially and
substantially changed since the entry of the decree, and (2) whether the modification of
the terms and conditions of the order would be an improvement and in the best interest of
the child. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.4 (2005); Utah R. Civ. P. 106. The Utah Supreme
Court has established a structured, bifurcated proceeding in which the issues addressed
by this provision are to be handled by the lower courts. See Hogge v. Hogge., 649 P.2d
51, 53-54 (Utah 1982); Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P.2d 624, 626 (Utah 1987).
Accordingly, when a trial court considers a petition to modify child custody after a
full trial on the issues, it must do so through a two-step, bifurcated hearing. "The first
step involves a determination that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred
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since the time of the last decree." Becker v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah, 1984). "In
the initial step, the court will receive evidence only as to the nature and materiality of any
changes in those circumstances upon which the earlier award of custody was based." Id.
(underlining added, italics in original). The first stage of the proceedings "is [thus]
designed to help the court decide if there is a valid reason to reopen a question already
settled by an earlier order...." Id. Only after making a finding of substantial change may
a court then consider whether a change in circumstances is in the child's best interests.
Id.
Separation of evidence and bifurcation of proceedings are necessary if the Utah
courts are to respect the doctrine of res judicata. Under Utah law, child custody decrees
are accorded particular deference by this doctrine because "a custody decree is predicated
on a particular set of facts, [. . . and must] not be modified in the absence of a showing of
a `substantial' or `material' change of circumstances which warrants doing so." Hogge,
649 P.2d at 53-54.
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly stated that the bifurcation test is proper in all
custody modification cases. The trial court determined that the schedules of busy
witnesses takes precedence over the need for bifurcation. (See, Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, Exh. A, at pp. 1-2; see also, Transcript Vol. I, at pp. 1-8.) However
the court in Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P.2d 624 (Utah 1987), held that "[m]any areas of the
law involve bifurcated procedures at the trial level. We do not see why this one is unduly
burdensome . . . change of circumstances involves a very narrow spectrum of evidence.
It should not be difficult for trial courts to keep the two separate." Kramer 738 P.2d at
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n.1. Further, a failure to abide by the bifurcated process delineated by the Utah Supreme
Court constitutes reversible error. Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942, 946 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).
In the instant case, Mr. Doyle filed an unopposed motion with the court for a
bifurcated hearing prior to the trial. The court granted that motion on September 19,
2007 - stating that: "[j]udicial economy is best served by having the material change
issue presented first, but the parties should be prepared to immediately proceed to
presentation of the substantive case if the Court determines the threshold issue has been
satisfied." (See, Record, at pp. 1600-02). The order was, thus, in line with well-
established Utah precedent upon this issue.
Nevertheless, at the October 2007 trial, and over the objection of Mr. Doyle, Judge
Lindberg allowed Ms. Doyle to proceed by presenting concurrent evidence on both the
issues of whether a material and substantial change in circumstances had occurred and
whether a change in custody was in the best interest of the child. (See, Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, Exh. A, at pp. 1-2; see also, Transcript Vol. I, at pp. 1-8). In
short, the trial court did not make a finding that a material and substantial change in
circumstances had, in fact, occurred before allowing evidence concerning best interest.
Before Mr. Doyle was permitted to put on any evidence as part of his case and
chief, Ms. Doyle had rested on all issues. Consequently, the trial court violated the
bifurcation rules set forth by Utah precedent - and, thus, committed reversible error.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court's decision.
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B.
	
The trial court did not make a specific finding of changed
circumstances.
Utah law clearly requires a Court to reach a finding of changed circumstances
before proceeding to the second stage of proceedings. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court
has directed the lower courts that they must first make a separate finding as to whether
there has been a material change in circumstances and identify the way in which those
circumstances have changed before they allocate custody on a petition to modify. Hogge,
649 P.2d at 54. Beyond being a mere formality, this threshold requirement is essential
for protecting the integrity of child custody orders and the stability of custodial
arrangements.
In the present case, the trial court disregarded the requirement that a separate
finding of changed circumstances be reached before proceeding to the best interest
inquiry. On this point, the record indicates that upon the commencement of the second
day of trial, Judge Lindberg entered a "preliminary" finding of changed circumstances,
before going on to consider the second day of testimony. (See, Transcript Vol. II, at pp.
254-63.) The court failed to comply with the rule in Hogge for at least two reasons.
First, by the time the trial court made its "preliminary" ruling, the court had
already heard from numerous witnesses regarding the best interests of the child thus
tainting any finding of changed circumstances ab initio. By receiving evidence regarding
the best interests of the child before ever making a finding on the issue of whether a
material and substantial change in circumstances had occurred, the trial court was
prevented from objectively ruling on the material and substantial change issue. At that
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point, it was impossible for the Court's ruling on the material and substantial change
issue not to have been influenced by the other evidence presented. Any finding of
changed circumstances at that point was irretrievably entangled with best interests
evidence.
Second, this "preliminary" finding was deficient because Judge Lindberg reached
this "preliminary" finding before Mr. Doyle had an opportunity to present evidence.
Although the court thereafter allowed Mr. Doyle the opportunity to put on some evidence
about the lack of material change in circumstances, the court cut off Mr. Doyle and ended
the trial before he had completed his presentation of evidence of the lack of changed
circumstances. Affording deference to the Court's finding on changed circumstances
would deny Mr. Doyle an opportunity to present all his evidence on a highly contested
factual matter. For this additional reason, this Court should reverse.
C.
	
The trial court's failure to bifurcate the proceedings on the petition to
modify custody prejudiced Mr. Doyle.
The court's failure to bifurcate these issues resulted in an irregularity in the
proceedings that deprived Mr. Doyle of a fair trial. In short, by failing to properly
bifurcate the trial, and by allowing Ms. Doyle to present all of her evidence on both the
issues of change in circumstances and best interests of the child, the Court effectively
allowed Ms. Doyle an evidentiary advantage. Essentially, the court permitted Ms. Doyle
to relitigate the issue of custody that had already been decided by Judge Noel. This case
was decided on the court's view of best interests without a proper determination of
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whether there had been a change in circumstances. The Hogge requirements were
established to prevent such relitigation.
Because the court did not follow established precedent in Hogge and because Mr.
Doyle did not receive a fair trial on this issue, the trial court's decision should be
reversed.
II. No SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE OF MATERIAL AND SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN
CIRCUMSTANCES
The court's failure to bifurcate the proceedings in the trial below caused reversible
error. Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942, 946 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Not only was the
procedure in this matter erroroneous, but the courts findings as to material changes were
also substantively insufficient. The changes in circumstances identified by the court were
three fold. None of them are supported with evidence that is sufficient under Hogge to
create a "material and substantial change".
A. The trial court made insufficient findings to justify a change of custody
because the trial court's findings do not demonstrate a substantial
change in circumstances in the custodial relationship.
In Kramer, the court held that the inquiry of changed circumstances must focus
exclusively on the parenting ability of the custodial parent and the functioning of the
established custodial relationship. . . . Any other approach will only promote "ping-
pong custody awards," precisely the evil Hogge was intended to eradicate. See Kramer,
738 P.2d at pp. 626-27 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added and citations omitted).
The trial court reached three findings that it deemed relevant to the issue of
material change in circumstances. First, the Court found that Judge Hiinonas' striking of
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the automatic change of custody provision in the original Decree of Divorce constituted a
material change of circumstances. (See, Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, E)h.
A, at ¶¶ 18-20.) Second, the Court found that Hyrum's social and academic performance
has worsened. (See, id., at ¶ 23). Finally, the Trial Court found that Mr. Doyle attempted
to "exclude" Ms. Doyle from interaction with Hyrum. (See, id., ¶¶ 24-25). These
findings are insufficient to determine whether there has been a substantial change in the
custodial relationship. Each finding is discussed in turn below.
1. As a matter of law, Judge Himonas' Alteration of the Decree of
Divorce is not a substantial change in circumstances.
The trial court found that Judge Himonas, the previous trial court judge, caused a
substantial change in circumstances. However, a judges' action could not be the factual
basis for a change in circumstances for at least two reasons. First, Judge Himonas' ruling
on January 11, 2006 made no change in the law or the facts. Rather it simply removed an
unlawful and unenforceable provision from the order. Second, the doctrine of res
judicata requires that an attack on the effect of a final order be appealed rather than raised
in a collateral attack. Neither party appealed Judge Himonas' ruling.
a.
	
Removal of the Unlawful Provision in the Divorce Decree. The original
Decree of Divorce provided that "In the event [Ms. Doyle] relocates to the Salt Lake
Valley, the parties will have joint legal and physical custody and shall share time equally
on alternating weeks and on holidays as per standard schedule." (See, Decree of Divorce,
Exh. B, at ¶ 2.) On January 11, 2006 Judge Himonas struck this automatic provision of
the Original Decree and entered the Amended Decree which set forth that change of
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custody requires notice and a hearing and must be made through a Petition to Modify the
Divorce Decree. (See, Record, at pp. 935-39.)
Under Utah law the provision for automatic change of custody was determined by
the court to be unlawful. In other words the court determined that the provision was
contrary to law and thus was void and could not have been enforced at any time. All that
Judge Himonas' Order on Motion for Relief from Judgment accomplished was to restore
the court's order to a lawful document. Because the stricken provision was unlawful, the
effect of the order was simply to remove a provision that was never of any force or effect.
Correction of an unlawful order cannot be a material change of circumstances as
determined by Judge Lindberg in her Findings of Facts and Conclusions of law at ¶18-20
because it changes nothing; a correction merely changes the apparent order to reflect
reality.
b.
	
Res Judicata. In Hogge, the Supreme Court stated, "[S]ince a custody
decree is predicated on a particular set of facts, that decree is res judicata and will not be
modified in the absence of a showing of a `substantial' or `material' change of
circumstances which warrants doing so." Id. (citing Trego v. Trego, Utah, 565 P.2d 74,
75 (1977); Smith v. Smith, Utah, 564 P.2d 307, 309 (1977)). The order of Judge
Himonas was no more than a change to the wording of the Divorce Decree.
A change to the wording of the order did not change the "particular set of facts"
upon which the order was based. See Hogge, 649 P.2d at 53-54. The court's actions
comprise the order and the law, not the facts on which the order is based. The facts are
by nature dependent on the conduct of the parties and the children and the events that
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occur in their lives. If determinations by a court could constitute a change in
circumstances, children would be at risk of being dragged through custodial fights each
time the court made a ruling.
c.
	
Ms. Doyle's move from Colorado. Ms. Doyle argued that her move from
Colorado to Utah was a sufficient change in circumstance to warrant reopening the
custody question. Although it is true that Ms. Doyle moved from Colorado to Utah, this
change is not of the type that constitutes a substantial and material change in the custodial
relationship because Ms. Doyle's changed circumstances do not change the custodial
relationship. Ms. Doyle's move did not affect the relationship between Hyrum and Mr.
Doyle. However, changes in the situation of the noncustodial parent have been
determined in other cases to be insufficient to cause a material change of circumstances
which would warrant reopening the question of custody. See e.g. Thorpe v. Jensen, 817
P.2d 387, 391 (Utah App., 1991) (Factors bearing on the circumstances of the non-
custodial parent are not relevant to the court's inquiry regarding changed circumstances);
Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593, 598 (Utah App., 1992) (When the party seeking
modification fails to establish changes in the presently-existing custody arrangement,
modification of that arrangement constitutes an abuse of discretion). Accordingly, Ms.
Doyle's move only changed the non-custodial parent's situation, and is thus insufficient
under Hogge-Becker to trigger an opening of child custody.
Because the effect of the January 11, 2006 order cannot constitute a change in
circumstances under Hogge and because Ms. Doyle's move cannot be considered a
19
sufficient change in circumstance as a matter of law, it was error for the court to modify
custody relying on these alleged changes in circumstances.
2.
	
The trial court's finding that Hyrum's social and academic
functioning has deteriorated is insufficient to modify a previous
allocation of custody, unless such resulted from a substantial
change in Hyrum's custodial relationship with Mr. Doyle.
Although the evidence showed that Hyrum was having trouble in school, and that
he was bullied, the court did not link this evidence to a change in the custodial
relationship. In fact the evidence relating to these concerns including Mr. Doyle's
testimony that he had spoken to the school administrators and teachers about steps they
were taking to protect Hyrum from bullying. The trial court found that Hyrum's social
and academic performance has worsened. (See, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, Exh. A, at If 23.) However, the court does not indicate which facts she relies on to
make these findings, so the findings are insufficient on their face. Even if the court had
tied the findings to specific facts in evidence, these findings would still be insufficient as
a matter of law to modify. an allocation of child custody. Under Kramer, the court must
focus on the custodial relationship.
The change of circumstances threshold is high so as to discourage frequent
modifications of child custody, and thus promote stability in a child's custodial
relationships. Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P.2d 624, 626 (Utah, 1987). The evidence showed
that Hyrum had braces on his legs, that he had been in special education programs and
that he was a loner. (See, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Exh. A.) There was
testimony that Mr. Doyle wanted to have Hyrum try to do without special education to
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see if he could shake the stigma associated with that program in the eyes of his
classmates. (See, Transcript Vol. 2, at pp. 313-80). The evidence adduced at trial
unquestionably shows that Hyrum suffers from several disabilities, including
neurological and learning disabilities. The fact that any child, let alone a child with such
challenges, underperforms socially or in school does not reflect on either the parenting
ability or the custodial relationship. It merely shows that the child is enduring challenges.
Without a specific finding that Hyrum's lack of progress was attributable to his father, a
finding of lack of progress is insufficient to create a material change under Kramer. See
also Becker v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah, 1984).
A finding that a child is not performing with his or her peer group is insufficient to
modify custody unless a Court finds that such sub-par performance results from, and is
caused by, a substantial change and corrosion of the custodial relationship. Absent a
finding of a substantial change in the relationship of the custodial parent and the minor
child, or a marked decline in the parenting ability of the custodial parent, a modification
of child custody unnecessarily jeopardizes the stability of a minor child's environment.
Judge Lindberg found that Mr. Doyle's involvement in Hyrum's education was
potentially disruptive because Mr. Doyle's behavior was occasionally "inappropriate" vis
a vis school staff. (See, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Exh. A, at ¶ 29). This
finding is vague and speculative. The court does not state whether Mr. Doyle's actions
affect the custodial relationship. It cannot be assumed that a parent's disagreement with a
teacher affects the custodial relationship, especially as in this case where Mr. Doyle was
fighting for his son.
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The Court found that Mr. Doyle continued to use corporal punishment (See,
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Exh. A, at ¶ 21). Mr. Doyle's testimony on
this point was that he had spanked Hyrum once when Hyrum was acting out. (See,
Transcript Vol. 2, at pp. 320-27.) There was neither finding nor evidence to contradict
Mr. Doyle's testimony. Further, the court failed to explain in its findings why one
instance of a spanking would be sufficient to meet the "high threshold" required in
Kramer.
Accordingly, this Court should not consider Hyrum's academic performance, his
sociality, Mr. Doyle's conduct with teachers or a one time instance as material or
substantial changes of circumstance.
B. As a matter of law, the trial court's findings that Mr. Doyle has
attempted to exclude Ms. Doyle from decision making does not
constitute a substantial change in circumstances.
The Trial Court found that Mr. Doyle has attempted to marginalize and isolate Ms.
Doyle from interactions with Hyrum. (See, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
Exh. A, at ¶ 25.) The Trial Court further found that this constitutes a substantial change
of circumstances. (See, id.) However, there is no fact to support these conclusions.
There was testimony that Mr. Doyle did not invite Ms. Doyle to an ESOP conference.
However, there is no evidence that Hyrum was adversely affected by this fact. The
parties do not share joint custody. There was no evidence that Hyruin's interests would
have been furthered by an invitation to Ms. Doyle to the ESOP conference. Mr. Doyle
provided all of the parent time Ms. Doyle was awarded by the court. (See, Transcript
Vol. II, at pp. 320-27.) Further, he cooperated with her so that she could act as a day care
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provider while Mr. Doyle worked. (See, id.) Without a fact to show that Mr. Doyle's
actions had adversely affected Hyrum, the court, as a matter of law, has failed to find a
material and substantial change in circumstances.
III. BEST INTERESTS
Mr. Doyle cared for Hyrum with utmost care. The only contrary evidence tends to
show that Mr. Doyle may have stepped on some toes at the school because he was so
determined to have the teachers give Hyrum attention. It was clear that Mr. Doyle
worked with Ms. Doyle to maximize the time of both parents with Hyrum. Hyrum had
food, clothes, educational opportunities and opportunities to be with other children.
Further, the fact that there were no material and substantial changes in the custodial
relationship is sufficient evidence for this court to determine that it is in Hyrum's best
interests to continue in the care of his father. Therefore the order on Petition for
Modification should be reversed.
IV. CHILD SUPPORT
The_ trial court's modification of_ child support was inappropriate
because Ms. Doyle did not petition the court for a modification of child
support and did not appeal from the original child support order.
In its Memorandum Decision Re: Child Support and SSDI Payments, (See Record
at pp. 1978-92), the trial court inappropriately modified the child support order in this
matter. In order for the trial court to adjust the amount an existing child support order, a
party must petition the Court for such a modification showing that a substantial change in
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circumstances has occurred. Utah Code Annotated § 78b-12-210(9). Respondent never
petitioned the Court for a modification of the child support order in this matter;
Respondent's petition to modify in this matter was specifically limited to the issue of
custody. Respondent must also show that the change results in a difference of 15% or
more between (1) the payor's ordered support amount and (2) the payor's support amount
that would be required under the guidelines. Utah Code Ann. § 78b-12-210(9).
Respondent did not allege that a 15% difference existed in her petition to modify custody,
nor did she provide any evidence that such a difference existed at the trial on her petition
to modify.
Moreover, the trial court had previously entered a child support order, decreeing
that both parents' child support obligations were satisfied by the Social Security
payments paid to Hyrum - regardless of who had physical custody of Hyrum. Given
these unique circumstances in this particular case, the change in custody recently ordered
by the Court does not constitute a substantial change in circumstances as it relates to
child support because that change in custody does not change the Court's underlying
basis for the its order regarding child support order - i.e., that Hyrum had an independent
source of funds in his Social Security benefits.
B.
	
The trial court's modification of child support was inappropriate
because the original child support order was not improper.
The trial court also incorrectly modified the court's previous child support award
finding that the previous order did not comport with the law - in that it credited Petitioner
with one half of Hyrum's SSDI payments and deeming those credits to satisfy the parties
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child support obligations. The trial court relied on §78b-12-203(8), which provides that
Social Security benefits received by a child shall be credited to the disabled parent's
portion of the child support obligation - in this case Ms. Doyle. However, this statute
does not prevent the Court from doing the same with the support obligation of the non-
disabled parent; it simply does not address this issue one way or the other.
The trial court also relied on the cases Brooks v. Brooks, 881 P.2d 955, 961 (Utah
App. 1994) and Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah App. 1995). However, neither of
these cases found that a trial court was prevented from crediting Social Security
payments toward a non-disabled parent's child support obligation. Brooks simply found
that a trial court could credit such payments toward a disabled parent's child support
obligation, not that a trial court could not do the same for a non-disabled parent's child
support obligation; it did not address this issue one way or the other. See, Brooks, 881
P.2d at 961. And while the court in Bowcutt found that the trial court was not compelled
by §78-45-7.5(8) to credit Social Security payments toward a non-disabled parent's child
support obligation, the Court again did not hold that the trial court could not do so if it
desired. See, Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d at 1056-57.
In fact, a trial court can do so. The authority to do so is granted by §30-3-5(1),
which provides that in a divorce proceeding, a trial court may make "equitable orders
relating to the children, debts or obligations, and parties." This section clearly provides
the trial court with the necessary authority to credit Hyrum's Social Security payments
towards the child support obligations of both parents. Judge Noel's order doing so was
not improper. This is true despite the fact that §78b-12-203(8) does not specifically
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address whether or not the trial court can credit such payments toward the non-disabled
parent's obligation. See, Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006, 1012 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
C.
	
The trial court's modification of child support was inappropriate
because it incorrectly used the new child support table.
The trial court also modified the child support using the new child support table
now codified at §78b-12-301. The trial court did so in error. Utah Code Annotated
§78b-12-301(2)(b) specifically provides that the new child support table is only to be
used to modify a child support order "entered for the first time on or after January 1,
2008." A child support order was clearly entered as part of the February 28, 2005
Divorce Decree, wherein the Court specifically ordered that "[t]he Social Security
payments for Hyrum due to Robin's disability are DECREED to satisfy both parties'
child support obligations, with the parties having no further child support claim against or
obligation to each other." (See, Divorce Decree, Exh. B.) Therefore, any modification of
this Order by the trial court would be a modification of an order entered for the first time
on February 28, 2005, and therefore, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78b-12-301(1),
should be calculated according to the old child support table set forth in that section.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court failed to bifurcate the proceedings into a two step inquiry as
required under Hogge. , When it allowed evidence regarding whether a modification
would be in the child's best interests before finding a substantial changed circumstances
prior to resolving the best interests inquiry, the court caused reversible error. This err
prejudiced Mr. Doyle because he was denied a full opportunity to contest the absence of a
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showing a change in circumstances. This error also undermines the judicial policy of
respecting previously adjudicated child custody orders absent evidence of a substantial
change in circumstances.
Even if this court assumes that the procedure in this case was proper, the Trial
Court below erred in its findings of a substantial and material change of circumstances.
Because the findings are conclusory and do not identify specific facts upon which the
court relied, its findings were insufficient to justify modification of a child custody
decree. Further, because the trial court's findings failed to establish a causal connection
between the changes noted by the court and the effect they had on the custodial
relationship, these changes, as a matter of law, were insufficient to satisfy the threshold in
Hogge. Because there is no evidence of a substantial change in circumstances and
because the petitioning party rested her entire case, this court should reverse and vacate
the order of modification.
DATED this	 2,6 ' day of January, 2009.
J, 	 	 '-
Steve S. Christensen
Matt Anderson
Benjamin Lusty
Attorneys for Appellant, Douglas Doyle
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Exhibit A
FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF. THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN.AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DOUGLAS PATRICK DOYLE,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
Petitioner,
	
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
MAY - 7 2008
SALT LAKE , COUNTY
Deputy Clerk
-vs-
ROBIN ELAINE DOYLE,
Respondent.
Case No. 034903528
Judge D,enise P. Lindberg
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey
On October 2 and 3, 2007, the Court held a bench trial on Respondent's Petition to Modify
the Divorce Decree entered by the Court on February 28, 2005. Petitioner Douglas Doyle (Doug))
	
..
was present and represented by counsel Steven Christensen andBrennan Moss. Respondent Robin
Doyle (Robin) was preSent and represented by counsel Su2anne Marelius. The parties' minor
child, Hyrum Doyle (Hyrum) did not participate in the trial, but was represented by private
Guardian ad Litem (GAL) Kim Luhn. In advance of trial Petitioner moved the Court to bifurcate
the trial into separate hearings-the first one to address whether the Petition to Modify met the
standard of a .substantial and material change in. circumstances, and the second one to consider
Hyrum's best interests.
¶2 The Court granted Petitioner's motion in part and denied it in part. The Court .agreed with
Petitioner that it was required by law to address first whether the threshold standard for granting
a modification had been met, and only if that threshold standard was satisfied would the Court
proceed to determine whether the requested custody modification was in. Hyrum's best interests.
..
	
.
However, the Court disagreed with Petitioner on the need for separate hearings. The Court
concluded that judicial economy was best served by having all the evidence presented during the
two (sequential) days set aside for trial,' although the two issues would be considered separately
and .in the order dictated by law.? Additionally, at the final pretrial conference, and again at the
beginning of trial, the Court discussed with the parties the amount of time that would be available
to each side to present its case.' Neither side lodged timely objections to the trial time allocation.
'By consolidating trial time witnesses only have to be called once to appear and testify,
sparing them the possibility of having their regular schedules twice disrupted and saving the
parties additional witness fees. See, e.g., Moody v. Moody, 715 P.2d 507, .511 (Utah .
1985)(Daniels, District Judge (concurring). By consolidating the presentation of the , evidence
the Court is also better able to remember all the relevant testimony without having to spend
additional preparation time between separate hearings to review notes and refresh its recollection
of the facts.
?At a pretrial hearing the Court had addressed various motions in. Limine brought by
Petitioner. One of the motions sought to exclude Dr. Hale's custody evaluation report on the
basis that the information in the report went to the issue of "best interests" and should not be
considered at the initial phase of the custody modification trial. The Court denied the motion
based on its prior ruling on the bifurcation issue. Petitioner then moved to continue the trial;
which motion.the Court also denied. The Court indicated it would address specific objections to
the evidence as they arose.
'The Court informed counsel that trial would begin at 9:00 a.m. each day, there would be
a mid-morning and mid-afternoon break (each of which would be 'approximately 15 minutes in
duration), a lunch break of approximately one hour, and the Court would recess each day
between 4 and 4:30 p.m. in order to handle other matters. Based on those break and recess
periods, each side would have approximately five (5) hours of time to present their case. The
GAL was allocated one (1) hour of trial time). Throughout the trial the Court kept the parties
informed as to the amount of time remaining to them. Although the Court extended the time
allotted to counsel by shortening or eliminating the normal mid-morning and mid-afternoon
breaks and by limiting the lunch periods significantly, Petitioner's counsel objected that they had
been denied the opportunity to present all the evidence they desired. The Court rejects' counsels'
claim. Having been given fair warning of the time limitations, Petitioner' counsel made tactical
decisions about how they wished to present their case and where they would spend their time.
Moreover, by announcing its determination on the threshold issue at the beginning of the second
2
¶3 After considering the evidence adduced during the first day, the Court opened the second
day of trial by stating the reasons why it was satisfied that the threshold showing of a substantial
and material change in circumstances had been met. Petitioner noted his objection on the grounds
that he had not had adequate opportunity to challenge Respondent's case. In response the Court
stated it would treat its judgment on this issue as "preliminary," and Petitioner was free to present
whatever other evidence he wished the Court to consider.'
¶4 At the conclusion of the second day of trial the Court reaffirmed its previously announced
determination that a substantial and material change of circumstances had indeed occurred which
was not anticipated at the time the Decree was entered. The Court also announced its findings and
judgment on the issue of what custodial arrangement would best serve Hyrum's interests. At the
Court's request Respondent's counsel prepared proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Decree of Modification, and forwarded the same to opposing coiuisel. Petitioner lodged
numerous objections which the Court has considered. After reviewing the trial record,.the exhibits
and testimony adduced at trial, and the arguments and objections of counsel, the Court is fully
advised. As more fully set forth below, the Court enters its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
day, the Court hoped to expedite matters and to free counsel to focus on the more critical issue of
the child's best interest. To the extent that counsel failed to heed the Court's warnings, mis-
allocated time and, as a result, did not cover all the issues they intended to cover, responsibility
for those choices lies with them rather than with the Court.
4After ruling on the existence of substantial, material change of circumstances,
Petitioner's counsel made an oral motion for mistrial. The Court denied the motion: Counsel for
Petitioner then made an oral motion to stay the ruling of the Court; that motion was also denied.
The Court directed the parties to continue their evidentiary presentation to prove the elements
required for the custody modification and defense. The trial continued thereafter on the issue of
best interests and Petitioner's defense to the Petition.
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and Decree. Before doing so, however, the Court digresses briefly to explain the background and
unusual posture of this case.
BACKGROUND.
¶5 . These parties were married in September 1995. They separated in June 2003.
Following a divorce trial held December 13 and 14, 2004, Judge Frank Noel entered Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and aDecree of Divorce on February 28, 2005.
¶6 ' The parties' on, Hyrum, was born July 29, 1996. He suffers from a peripheral nerve
disorder known as "Charcot Marie Tooth Syndrome," which cause patients slowly to lose
normal use of their extremities due to muscle and nerve degeneration. Hyrum has also
exhibited other learning and speech delays, and began receiving special education services
¶7
	
At the time the Divorce Decree was entered Robin was living in Colorado; Hyrum was
in Salt.Lake in the custody of his father. In his Findings of.Fact accompanying the Divorce
Decree Judge Noel noted that Doug's rigid and harsh' methods with respect to both Robin and
Hyrum had resulted in "some abuse" to both. With respect to Robin, Judge Noel noted Doug
had sought to exercise control 'over Robin; her ,activities and relationships. With respect to
Hyrum, Judge Noel expressly referenced one incident prior to May 2003 "in which Doug
slapped Hyrum and in which Doug verbally abused Hyrum." Findings of Fact, ¶7.
Nevertheless, Judge Noel concluded that since the time of that ,incident Doug had "grown" and
had shown a "sincere desire to improve and be a good father." Id. at ¶8. . Judge Noel further
found that Doug and Hyrum shared a loving relationship, that Hyrum had "thrived" in his '
father's care, and was "happy and contented in Doug's custody." Id. at ¶11. Judge Noel stated:
through.the Salt Lake School. District in preschool, at age.3..;^'
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"The evidence further suggests that [Hyrum] has established a network of friends and
relationships in which he is happy, and that he is actively involved in scouting and church
activities." Based on these findings Judge Noel determined that Doug should be awarded sole
legal and physical custody of Hyrum. But, Judge Noel's Decree also provided that "[i]n the
event [Robin] relocates to the Salt Lake Valley, the parties will have joint legal and physical
custody and shall share time equally on alternating weeks and on holidays as per standard
schedule." Decree, at ¶2.
¶8
	
It is evident from Judge Noel's findings of fact that his principal reason for awarding
custody as he did was so as not to disrupt an environment in which Hyrum was happy and
thriving. It is also apparent that Judge Noel believed Robin and Doug were equally capable of
meeting Hyrum's needs, as evidenced by the fact that the Decree anticipated the two would
share joint legal and physical custody of Hyrum if Robin returned to Salt Lake County.
¶9
	
Given the rationale adopted by Judge Noel in his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law in support of the Divorce Decree, and the anticipated opportunity to share custody of
Hyrum if she returned to Utah, Robin gave up her job in•Denver, where she was teaching
science as an adjunct faculty member at Front Range. Community College. Robin relocated to,.
Salt Lake City on May 9; 2005, moving to an apartment across the street from Hyrum's
elementary school (Woodrow Wilson Elementary) where he was attending the 4th grade.
¶10 Shortly thereafter, on May 27, 2005, Robin filed a Motion for a New Trial. Doug had
earlier filed a Motion,for Relief from judgment. In the interim, Judge Noel had retired from
the Court and his caseload had been assigned to Judge Deno Himonas. On August 12, 2005,
Judge Himonas held a hearing on the parties' respective motions. At the conclusion . of the.
hearing Judge Himonas denied Robin's motion and granted Doug's motion.. An Order
reflecting the Court's ruling was entered January 11, 2006.
¶11
	
Judge Himonas' ruling was based on his finding that the provisions in the Divorce ,
Decree for change of custody "require[d] notice and a hearing and "[could not] occur
automatically upon a specified event." Judge Himonas' Order explained that the effect of the
ruling meant that Doug would retain sole legal and physical custody of Hyrum, and that "any
request to modify the custody award [would have to be] made by Petition to Modify the
Divorce Decree." Based on the Court's ruling and Order, Robin filed a Verified Petition for
Modification on-October 11, 2005. , . .
	
.
¶12 Upon Robin's return to Salt Lake the parties began sharing equal parent time; Robin.
later filed a. Motion for Temporary Orders to clarify the parent time and custody status. That
Motion was heard by the Commissioner on November 16, 2005. An Order reflecting the
recommendations of the Commissioner was signed by the ' Court on January 23, 2006. Pursuant
to the Commissioner! s recommendation the Court denied the request to change custody, but
ordered that the. parties continue implementing the shared parenting arrangement without
labeling it joint custody. Specifically, the Court ordered that the-parties "share equal time with
the minor child on a seven day rotating basis." The. Commissioner determined that the parent
time award in the Divorce Decree was stated separately from the custody teinis that Judge
Himonas' Order had invalidated. Therefore, the Commissioner recommended that the time
sharing provisions be enforced, as consistent with Judge Noel's Decree.
	
.
¶13 The Court's Order of January 23, 2006 also provided that there. should be no change to
Hyrum's school enrollment unless the parties mutually agreed to the change.
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¶14 On or about March 2006, Robin requested that the Court order a custody evaluation,
and proposed to the Court the names of two possible evaluators. The Court agreed that a
custody evaluation was indicated and appointed Valerie Hale, Ph.D. to perform it. The Court
ordered that the parties jointly share the expense of the evaluation. In order to have the
evaluation commence as quickly as possible, the Court's order provided that Robin could pay
Dr. Hale's entire initial retainer, and that Doug would reimburse Robin for his obligation of
one half of the retainer; Doug was ordered to reimburse Robin at the rate of $100.00 per month.
¶15 Robin receives disability payments based on her total blindness. As a result of Robin's
disability, the Social Security Administration also pays a dependent payment in the amount of
$614 per month.. Paragraph 6 of the Divorce Decree provided that the benefit received on
Hyrum's behalf would be allocated in lieu of other child support. At Paragraph 7 of the
Decree, the Court awarded Hyrum's , entire dependent payment .to"Doug as long as he had sole
custody. In the event that Robin relocated to Salt Lake County,. the Decree further ordered that
Robin would become the payee on the dependent payment, and that the amounts received be
equally divided between Doug and Robin.
¶16 The unusual procedural posture of this case, involving, as it does, changed factual
circumstances as well as a changed legal interpretation of how regarding certain provisions of
the Divorce Decree can be effectuated, creates the context in which the Court makes its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
Findings Re_ardin_ Substantial and Material Chan_es in Circumstances Not Antici•ated at .
Time Decree Entered.
7
¶17 During the divorce trial before Judge Noel, Doug had challenged Robin's fitness to care
for Hyrum on the basis of some serious mental health crises Robin had experienced for a time.'
Nevertheless, this Court is persuaded that Judge Noel's decision to award Petitioner legal
custody was not based on Robin's alleged unfitness. Rather, the Court's decision was based on
the fact that, at the time, Robin was residing and working in Colorado and Hyrum was doing
well in a stable and supportive environment under his father' care. By ruling that upon Robin's
relocation to Salt Lake County she and Doug would exercise joint legal and physical custody of
Hyrum, Judge Noel implicitly rejected the substance of Doug's claims, concluding instead that
both were "fit and proper parents."
¶18 Relying on the terms. of the Divorce Decree that provided for automatic change of
custodyif she moved back to. Salt Lake, Robin informed her employer she would not be
renewing her teaching contract, and completed her relocation to Salt Lake (and to Hyrum' 's
neighborhood) within six to eight weeks following entry of the Decree.
. ¶19 The parties demonstrated their understanding of Judge Noel's Decree by the fact that
they began implementing the shared custody provisions of the Divorce Decree even as they
sought to change it.
¶20. When Judge Himonas determined that the automatic change of custody provisions of
the Divorce Decree violated Utah law; the parties were faced with a new legal interpretation of
the Decree that neither side could have foreseen at the time it was entered.
'During the parties' marriage Robin experienced a serious episode of clinical depression
that required she be hospitalized for a period of time.
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¶21
	
Additionally, Judge Noel clearly anticipated that Doug's parenting skills would
continue to develop, and that he would adopt less harsh discipline methods towards Hyrum.
in,fact, however, Doug has continued to rely excessively on corporal punishment to the extent
that, based on Hyrum's reports, Dr. Gardner (Hyrum's pediatrician) felt compelled to make a
child abuse referral to DCFS.
¶22 Although there was insufficient evidence presented to. allow the: Court to find that child
abuse in fact has occurred (and DCFS has apparently not.completed an investigation of the
referral) the very fact that Hyrum's pediatrician felt it necessary to make the referral suggests
that Doug has not adopted the more age-appropriate and less harsh disciplinary methods that
Judge Noel expected him to implement.'
¶23 At the time the Divorce Decree was entered, Judge Noel also expected that Hyrum ,
:would continue to enjoy stability andi success in Doug's care. Contrary to Judge Noel's
expectations, the evidence presented at trial leads the Court to find that Hyrum has not been
thriving in Doug's care. As more fully explained below, credible testimony from Dr. Valerie .
Hale, the Court-appointed evaluator, leads the Court to find that , since Judge Noel entered his
findings, Hyrum's level of social, educational, and psychological functioning has deteriorated.
'As referenced earlier, Judge Noel found that Doug had previously slapped and verbally
abused Hyrum, but the Court thought that Doug had "learned more appropriate conduct" and
"shown a sincere desire to change and to use appropriate [discipline] methods." See Judge Noel's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at ¶¶ 7,8.
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Indeed, at various times since the Decree entered, Hyrum has displayed increased anxiety levels
and seriously dysfunctional ideation and behaviors.'
¶24 At ¶ 20 of his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Judge Noel stated as follows:
The Court finds that if either Doug or Robin do not foster a loving relationship
for the child by both parents for the benefit of the child, by either limiting access
to the child unreasonably . . . then the Court finds and is of the opinion that the
parent does not have the best interest of the child at heart and the Court would
take that into account in the future; if any petition to modify the Decree of
Divorce comes before the Court... .
¶25 , Testimony from Dr.. Valerie Hale, the Court-appointed evaluator, indicates that Doug has
attempted to marginalize Robin's relationship with Hyrum by taking actions such as unplugging
	
.
the phone, or restricting other contacts between Hyrum and Robin.' As explained below,
additional evidence of Doug's actions to marginalize Robin can be found in his objections to
having Robi.n .participate in Hyrurn's.IEP, as reported by school personnel. It is also of great
concern to the Court that, in summarizing her findings, Dr. Hale commented that "Doug
honestly fe[els] that nothing good [can] come to Hyrum from spending time with Robin." The
'See, e.g., note 8 infra. Dr. Hale also reported receiving crisis calls from Hyrum during
the course of her evaluation. Although the Court is not altogether clear on the extent to which
Hyrum may (or may not) . be in crisis presently, the testimony from both Dr. Hale and Dr. Juan
Mejia (Doug's expert) amply support a finding that Hyrum continues to need psychological
counseling. One of the very few bright spots in the continuing battle between the parents is that
both parents now appear to be supporting Hyrum's involvement in counseling with Dr. Merrill
Kingston.
'In particular, Dr. Hale expressed serious concerns about Doug's ability to manage
Hyrum as he entered his teenage years-a time when children's psychological task is to
differentiate themselves from their parents. To address these concerns Dr. Hale recommended
that Hyrum continue psychotherapy with Dr. Kingston, and that Doug also consider
psychotherapy with a qualified therapist to assist him in understanding the effect of his
interpersonal behaviors on others.
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Court finds that such views and conduct are clearly contrary to Judge Noel's expectation at the
time he made his initial custody determination. Therefore, they call into question Judge Noel's
initial judgment that Doug would ultimately prove himself to be an effective and cooperative
parent. As suggested by Judge Noel at ¶20 of his Findings, parental efforts to exclude the other
parent would be an important consideration for the Court in entertaining a future petition to
modify the Decree.
Findings Regarding Hyrum's Best Interests.
¶26 At the trial, Dr. Hale testified at length from her custody evaluation report, which was
admitted as an exhibit at trial and is part of the case record. Dr. Hale's report carefully
examined the required Rule 4-903 considerations, and her findings were based on an extensive
data-collection effort that involved interviewing the panties,. Hyrum, and numerous collateral
sources, as well as examining nearly 30.0 documents. Based on her evaluation Dr. Hale
recommended that. Robin be awarded sole legal and physical custody of Hyrum, and that, with.
one modification, Doug be given "standard" parent-time in accord with the schedule at Utah
Code §30-3-35. The modification suggested by Dr. Hale was that Hyrum's mid-week parent-
time with Doug extend to include an overnight stay. The Court relies on, and largely adopts the
analysis and recommendations of Dr. Hale's report as one of the bases supporting the Court's
findings of fact that Hyrum's best interests will be served by modifying the custody arrangement
that has existed between the parties.
127 Based on the data she collected . and analyzed, Dr. Hale concluded that Doug's attitudes
and actions continue to be overly rigid, judgmental and moralistic, and these patterns of thought
and action are unlikely to change much in the future. According to Dr. Hale, Doug tends to be
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unduly critical of anyone-whether it be Hyrum, his teachers, or Robin-whose actions he deems
to fall below a certain standard of "appropriate" behavior. Dr. Hale reports that Doug has
considerable difficulty in accepting, or even considering, that others may legitimately hold
views that differ from his own. Based on other trial testimony and the Court's own
observations, the Court agrees with Dr. Hale's assessment.
¶28 In the course of conducting her custody evaluation Dr. Hale spoke with a number of
school personnel at Woodrow Wilson elementary school, where Hyrum attends. Specifically,
Dr. Hale had contact with (a) Hyrum's 4 th, and 5th grade teachers, (b) the school's social worker,
(c) the district's occupational therapist and speech language coordinator, (d) the school's
special education and resource teacher, (f) the school counselor, and (g) the school principal. A
number of these individuals also testified at trial. All expressed serious concerns about Hyrum's
circumstances and.fuinctioning.
¶29 The school personnel conf rmed that in March 2006-and against the school's
recommendation-Doug discontinued Hyrum's participation in special education and resource
classes; he has also twice attempted to move Hyrum to a different school.' The school
'At various points in his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Judge Noel clearly
determined that Hyrum's best interests required that he be able to enjoy stability and .
predictability in his school and neighborhood environment. By implication, Judge Noel found
that Woodrow Wilson Elementary provided the necessary environment to meet Hyrum's needs. .
For example, at ¶7 of his Findings of Fact, Judge Noel conditions having Doug retain the
disability payments received on Hyrum's behalf "so long as he remains in his current
neighborhood and Hyrum attends his current school while Robin lives in Colorado." Moreover,
the change in custody anticipated by the Decree upon Robin's relocation to Salt Lake carried
with it the additional proviso that she secure a residence "where Hyrum can reasonably attend his
current school from her home . . ." Judge Noel then reiterates "while Doug remains in his current
neighborhood and Hyrum attends his current school, the parties should equally share time with .
Hyrum so that each parent has Hyrum in his [or] her home 26 weeks out of the year." Clearly,
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this was a very important consideration for Judge Noel as he determined what was in Hyrum's
best interest.
'°At trial, Hyrum's school counselor (Ms. Webster), testified that Doug had complained
of a playground bullying incident in which he felt Hyrum had been victimized. Ms. Webster
investigated the incident at length, but Doug was very critical of her investigation and would not
accept her findings as valid. Additionally, .Ms. Webster testified that Hyrum appeared very stiff
and uncomfortable in the presence . of his father, but was very relaxed with his mother.
personnel also confirmed that Hyrum continues to need academic support to remain on grade
level, and that he is not performing at grade level in science and language. The school personnel
also testified that Hyrum is socially isolated, and that Doug has disrupted the educational setting
by inappropriately confronting teachers and by threatening litigation. For example, the school •
counselor, Mrs. Webster, testified that at the time of Hyrum's February 2005 IEP conference she
asked police to be "on standby". because of what she perceived to .be Doug's threats. She also
testified that in her interactions with Doug she always arranges to have a third-party present to
witness the interaction, due to her ongoing concerns in dealing with Doug. 1 °
¶30 In contrast, school personnel testified very positively regarding Robin's interactions with
the school. They indicated that Robin has volunteered at the school over a period of years, and
has a good relationship with the teachers and other. school .personriel:. Robin is viewed as being
supportive of, and responsive to, Hyrum's needs, but has been limited in the past because of '
Doug's actions to exclude her from the IEP process. 11
'School personnel testified that Doug had insisted it was inappropriate for the school to
involve Robin in planning Hyrum's IEP because he was the parent with sole legal and physical
custody.
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¶31 Credible testimony from Hyrum's school teachers and other school personnel establishes
that Doug has taken actions that isolate Hyrum and that are not supportive of his needs, such as
prohibiting Hyrum from participating in, certain school enrichment programs, and removing him
from the special education resources for which he qualifies and from which he was previously •
benefitting.
¶32 Based on the totality of the testimony from Hyrum's school personnel, the Court finds
that Robin appears to have a better understanding of Hyrum's academic needs, and is better
able than Doug to support Hyrum's needs in this area.
¶33 Despite Robin's documented earlier history of severe depression, Dr. Hale found her to
be functioning very well presently. Dr. Hale further indicated that she saw no indication that •
Robin's past mental health issues would.be likely to recur. According'' to Dr. Hale, Robin is an
excellent parent who can .empathize with Hyrum. and , anticipate. his needs. She is also a :vigorous
VIA. appropriate , advocate of action to enhance Hyrum's psychological . and social development.'
Robin has demonstrated more consistent commitment to ensuring that Hyrum participates in
appropriate therapy. In contrast, the Court is very concerned that at one point Doug .withdrew
Hyrum froth therapy during a time'when ' Hyruiu .was clearly experiencing, great difficulties.
Moreover, it appears that Doug's actions were driven by. his disagreements with Hyrum's then-
therapist, without giving due consideration to Hyrum's needs at the time.' While both parents
12A therapist by the name of Laura Clark was seeing Hyrum in June 2005. At the time
Hyrum was presenting with a variety of "tics," high anxiety, suicidal ideation, and violent
ideation. 'Ms. Clark provided therapy services for approximately 10 months, but Doug
discontinued the therapy with Ms. Clark after she wrote a letter (dated March 17, 2006) with
which Doug took issue. See Ex. 15.
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appear to be supporting Hyrum's present involvement in psychological counseling, the Court
fmds that Robin has demonstrated a more consistent track record than Doug in this regard.
¶34 Based on the testimony at trial, the Court finds that Robin is the parent better suited, by
way of character and temperament, to. serve as the custodial parent. The Court relies on the
testimony and report from Dr. Hale to find that Robin is more likely to foster an ongoing
relationship between Hyrum and the other parent than what Doug would do if the Court were to
make him. the primary custodial parent: Illustrative of the testimony that supports the .Court's
finding on this issue (and to which the Court gives considerable weight) is a comment by Hyrum
reported by Dr. Hale in the course of her testimony. According to Dr. Hale, Hyrum told her that
"mom helps [him] buy gifts for dad, but dad will not help [him] to buy gifts for mom:" By
contrast, the Court .is persuaded that if given the opportunity to do so, Doug will continue his
efforts to exclude Robin from Hyrum's life. As Dr. Hale noted in her testimony, "Doug
honestly feels that nothing good can come to Hyrum from having him spend time with Robin."
Elsewhere in her testimony Dr. Hale stated: "Doug's idea of an ideal situation [for Hyrum] is
that after Doug remarries his new wife would take over providing care for Hyrum after school:"
The Court interprets Dr. Hale's testimony on this issue to mean that, in Doug's view, such an
eventuality would largely eliminate the need for Robin's involvement in Hyrum's daily care.
¶35 In reporting the results of her evaluation Dr. Hale indicated that Doug's rigidity in
behavior and attitude suggested a diagnosis of Obsessive-Compulsive Personality Disorder
(OCPD). In response, Doug presented lengthy testimony from his expert, Dr. Mejia, to
challenge Dr. Hale's ostensible "diagnosis." The Court need not reach the question whether Dr.
Hale's diagnostic. label for Doug is accurate. Indeed, the Court believes it was unfortunate that
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Dr. Hale used this diagnostic label because an unproductive amount of time was expended in
attempting to refute it. The Court's determination that Robin is the parent best able to meet
Hyrum's needs does not depend on the accuracy of Dr. Hale's "diagnosis." What is relevant to
the Court are the behaviors and attitudes exhibited by the parties in relation to each other, to
Hyrum, and to others who are signifidant in Hyrum's world. , To the extent that testimony from
neutral witnesses converges on a point, the Court gives great weight to the facts established
thereby, irrespective of labels that may or may not be applicable.
¶36 ' Dr. Mejia also offered opinion testimony regarding Hyrum's desires and interests. Dr.
Mejia testified that his opinion was based on various meetings involving Doug and Hyrum.
Although Dr. Mejia testified he had seen Hyrum on approximately six occasions, he did not .
clarify the length of each of those meetings, exactly who was involved what transpired oil those
occasions, or what his focus and purpose was in those interactions. Dr. Mejia also
acknowledged that he had not met with Robin (either singly or with Hyrum), that he had not
conducted a custody evaluation per se, and that he had not made any collateral contacts. Thus,
Dr. Mejia's own testimony establishes the limited bases for his' opinions. After considering the
opinion testimony offered by both Dr. Hale and `Dr. Mejia, on the basis of the breadth of Dr.
Hale's work,13and'her analysis of those findings in the context of the Rule 4-903 requirements,
the Court finds Dr. Hale's testimony and report to be. more credible and carry ,greater validity.
13As documented in her custody evaluation report, in conducting her evaluation Dr. Hale
reviewed over 300 documents over a seven-month period, and met numerous times with the
parties, with Hyrum, and with. other significant collateral contacts.
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¶37 The Court has also considered, and given great weight to, the recommendations of the
GAL, who endorses Dr. Hale's recommendation that Robin be awarded legal and primary
physical custody of Hyrum. The GAL, however, has recommended a substantially more liberal
parent-time schedule than the one suggested by Dr. Hale. Specifically, the GAL recommends
that Doug be awarded alternate weekends with Hyrum beginning Thursdays after school until
Monday morning. On the alternate weeks when Doug does not have weekend parent-time, his
Wednesday mid-week parent-time extend overnight.' The Court agrees with the GAL's
recommendation and finds it to be an appropriate parent-time schedule for Doug and Hyrum. In
addition, Doug should be awarded standard holiday time schedule. The Court further finds. that
it is in Hyrum? s best interest to enjoy two weeks of uninterrupted parent-time with each of his
parents during the summer.
138 The GAL also recommended that the. Court appoint a parent coordinator to facilitate
resolution. of issues that may arise between the parents in implementing parent-time
arrangements, and that the. parties each bear. one-half the cost associated with the services of a
parent coordinator. In announcing certain preliminary findings at the conclusion of trial the
Court agreed with the GAL and found that empLoying a parent coordinator would assist these
parties to work through difficulties that might arise in connection with parent-time issues or
other -minor custody matters, thus serving Hyrum's best interest. 14
"Subsequent to trial, however, the Court held a hearing on March 19, 2008 at which the
parties, their counsel, and the GAL were present. At that hearing the GAL modified her earlier
recommendation that the parties engage the services of a parent coordinator. The GAL informed
the Court that since the time of trial, Dr. Kingston (Hyrum's therapist) had successfully assisted
the parties in resolving some disputes that had arisen. The GAL recommended that as long as
Dr. Kingston is comfortable assisting the parties in this manner, the Court should defer requiring
17
¶39 The testimony at trial was limited to the issues of (a) material change in circumstances
and (b) the best interest of the minor child. Respondent's proposed findings of fact/conclusions
of law include certain financial matters not specifically addressed at trial. Specifically, some . of
Respondent's proposed findings rely on the parties'. verified financial declarations to establish
their respective monthly incomes. Others address the proper calculation of child support
(including Robin's SSDI benefits and/or the dependent disability benefits currently received on
Hyrum's behalf), claims for judgments for child support arrears, for allocation of Dr. Hale'.s
fees, and for attorney's•fees. Petitioner has objected to those proposed findings on various
grounds. 15 The Court agrees with Petitioner that, at trial, no evidence nor argument *as
presented directly dealing with financial issues. ' Accordingly, the Court will not . address those
issues as part of the present Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law, but will address them
through a separate Memorandum Decision after it has considered the parties' supplemental
briefing.
Baked on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters 'the following: .
CONCLUSIONSOF LAW '
¶40 The Findings *of Fact at ¶¶1-25 of this decision amply support the Court's conclusion
that Robin has adequately established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a substantial and
the parties to secure the services of a parent coordinator. The Court agrees and finds that
implementation of a parent coordinator should be deferred until such time as the present
arrangement fails. At that point, either party or the GAL should be free to bring the matter back
to the Court's attention for action.
"Petitioner argues that either insufficient (or no) evidence was presented at trial upon
which Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on.those issues could be based, and/or that the
Court did not state findings nor take those issues under advisement.
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material change in circumstances occurred that was not anticipated at the time Judge Noel
entered the Divorce Decree, in this case. These changed circumstances are more than sufficient
to justify a custody modification in this case.
¶41
	
The Findings of Fact at ¶¶26-38 of this decision amply support the Court's conclusion
that Hyrum's best interest will be best served by granting Robin sole legal and physical custody
of Hyrum, *subject to Doug's exercise of liberal parent time as referenced supra at ¶37. In
reaching this conclusion the . Court has expressly relied upon, and . adopted, the recommendations
of the custody evaluator and of the GAL. To the extent the GAL's recommendations modify the
custody evaluator's recommendations, the Court concludes that the GAL's modifications are
appropriate and should be implemented.
¶42 It is in Hyrum's best interest that the parties adopt a mechanism to assist them in
resolving the recurring disputes about his care that presently contribute to the contention
between them. For that reason the Court initially agreed with the GAL's recommendation -that a
parent coordinator should be appointed. Because it now appears that Hyrum's present therapist
has been successful in assisting. the parties to deal with some of these issues informally, the
	
.
Court has determined that the appointment of a parent coordinator can be deferred. However, if .
at some point Hyrumm's therapist determines that he cannot (or should not) continue to mediate
informally whatever minor parent-time or other disputes may arise between the parties, then the
Court concludes that Hyrum's best interests will be best served by promptly retaining a parent
coordinator. If so, either party (or the GAL) can bring the matter to the Court's attention for
prompt action. Robin and Doug shall be equally liable for the expenses of a parent coordinator,
19
and will need to pay one-half of any retainer that may be required within thirty (30) days of a
hearing at which either the Court orders, or the Commissioner recommends, such action.
143
	
Although at the time of the trial the Court anticipated that its determination regarding
change in custody would be implemented reasonably promptly, delays occasioned by the need to
resolve objections to the Court's decision resulted in the, parties continuing their shared custody
arrangement. At the hearing held March 19, 2008, the Court heard argument from the parties
and from the GAL. The GAL argued ' that Hyrum's best interests were not being served by
prolonging the period of shared custody, and urged the Court to enter promptly an Interim Order
of Modification so the custodial changes could . be implemented prior to the conclusion of
Hyrum's Easter/Spring break. The Court was persuaded by the GAL's argument and that same
day entered the requested Interim Order. In issuing these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, the Court hereby reaffirms its' earlier conclusion that entry of the Interim Order was fair,
appropriate, and in Hyrum's best interest.
n T44 Respondent is directed to prepare an Order of Modification consistent with these
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
SO ORDERED BY THE COURT this 	 9	 day of
	
, 2008.
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - STATE.OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY - MATHESON COURTHOUSE
DOUGLAS PATRICK DOYLE,
	
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Petitioner,
vs.
ROBIN ELAINE DOYLE,
	
Civil. No. 034903528
Judge Frank G. Noel
Respondent.
	
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey
The court, having sied and entered findings of fact and conclusions of
law in this matter, now ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES as follows:
1. Petitioner is granted a divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences
and separation. The divorce is now FINAL upon signing and entrS of this decree..
2. The petitioner ["Doug"] is hereby decreed to have sole legal and physical
custody of the minor child, Hyrum. In the event respondent ["Robin"] relocates to
the Salt Lake Valley, the parties will have joint legal and physical custody and shall
share. time equally on alternating weeks and on holidays as. per standard-schedule.
3. Doug is to make accommodations so-that Hyrum will have his own bed
within 6 months.
oug and Robin own no real property. The personal property is
DECREED divided as it has been divided, except that Doug is ORDERED to
reasonably return to Robin, in good working order, the computer, with software
and hardware to assist the blind, and with all tsof are,)hardware, printer, display
monitors, cables, and things necessary to utilize the computer and attachments that
go with the computer, that were obtained during the marriage. Doug is also further
ORDERED to cause duplicates to be made of all wedding and family photographs
and videos that he wishes to keep and to provide those duplicates, together with all
wedding and family photographs that he does not wish to keep, to Robin. Robin is
ORDERED to reimburse Doug for one-half of the actual reasonable out-of-pocket
cost incurred and paid by Doug for causing the duplicates to be.made. The parties
are each awarded their separate retirement plans, pension plans, profit sharing
plans, and the like, and neither party shall have any interest in, or to claim to, any .
retirement plans, pension plans, profit sharing plans,. and the like of the other party.
he parties are each ORDERED to pay their own debts incurred by them
after they separated and to save the other harmless therefrom. Doug is ORDERED
to pay all debts incurred by the parties prior to their separation, except for the debt
on the USAA credit card and the Deseret First credit card, which is ordered to be
paid as follows. Doug shall pay that portion of principal and interest attributable to
the cash advances and charges he incurred after the parties separated. As to that
portion attributable to the balance on those two cards on the date of separation,
Doug shall pay 5/8 and Robin shall pay 3/8, with each party to save the other party
harmless therefrom. In the event either party pays any portion of debt that is the
responsibility of the other.party hereunder, the other party shall promptly reimburse
e
	
for all sums actually paid by the.other party for all amounts so paid. In
her sole discretion, Robin may make a one-time election within a reasonable time of
the entry of this decree to reallocate the parties' obligations on the USAA credit
card and the Deseret First credit card hereunder by decreasing Doug's obligation to
pay on one card and increasing his obligation to pay on the other card in an equal
amount by given written notice to Doug setting forth that election. The parties shall '
each bear their own court costs and attorney fees incurred in this divorce action
on Hyruzn's disability check and shall retain the entire check amount for use in
supporting Hyrum so long as he has sole custody. In the event that Robin moves to
Salt Lake County and lives where Hyrum can reasonably attend his current school
from her. home, while Doug remains in his current neighborhood and Hyrum.
attends his current. school, the parties shall equally share time with Hyrum so that
, each parent has Hyrum in his and her home 26 weeks out of the year. Absent
agreement to the contrary, the weeks shall alternate, with the exchange taking place
between noon and 2;00 p.m. each Saturday, and .with the party who will have
Hyrum during the coming week responsible for picking him up. The parties are
ORDERED to reasonably adjust this schedule in order to alternate major holidays
each year and to give each parent one extended period of several weeks each year
for a lengthy vacation. The parties may mutually agree to otherwise extend such
• parent time for longer than a week so long as a compensating extension is agreed to
and provided for the other parent at another time or times, so that the overall times
remain roughly equal, but in any event, Robin will . still enjoy an uninterrupted six
weeks with Hyrum during the summer of 2005. It is the intent of the court to place
upon the parties the responsibility for reasonably working together to accommodate
each other on parent time and to ensure that the provisions of this decree are
satisfied, and both are ORDERED to substantially equalize the parent time if they
both live in Salt Lake County in a reasonable fashion without construing anything
in this decree as limiting their right to do so as parents with joint legal and physical
custody. If both parties -live in . S alt Lake County, Robin shall be the payee on
Hyrum's disability check with both parties sharing the payments equally. If both
parties live in Salt Lake County, they are both ORDERED to keep Hyrum in his
current neighborhood and school. Until such time as Robin moves to Salt Lake
County, Robin is granted liberal and reasonable telephone visitation with Hyrum
and Doug is ORDERED to ensure that there is reasonable telephone contact
6. No alimony is awarded to either party, . The Social Security payments
paid for Hyrum due to Robin's disability are DECREED to satisfy both parties'
child support obligations; with the parties having no further child support claim
against or obligation to each other. The parties are ORDERED to reasonably
support Hyrum and to generate sufficient money to meet his reasonable needs for
food, clothing, shelter, education, recreation, transportation, religious participation,
incidentals, and healthcare, until such time as Hyrum reaches eighteen years of age.
til Hyrum reaches eighteen years of age, the parties are ORDERED
to reasonably cooperate in providing each parent with as much time with Hyrum in
that parent's home as possible. Each party is ORDERED to fully refrain from any
attempt to exercise authority over the other parent or dyer parent time matters, and,
if Robin relocates, to reasonably cooperate in eq	 ally dividing the time to the fullest
extent that it is possible to do so on. alternating weeks. The following minimums
apply, but are only minimums, with the parties ORDERED to try to equalize
parent lime. So long as Doug remainsin his current neighborhood and Hyrum
attends his current school, while Robin lives in Colorado, Robin shall be entitled to
at least minimum standard visitation on the same schedule that the parties have
been following, except that Robin shall have an uninterrupted six weeks with .
Hyrum in her home each summer, starting in the. summer of 2005, and shall also
have any other reasonable time that she happens to be in Salt Lake County after
having given Doug 24 hours notice, Robin shall be responsible for pic
upfrom Doug in Salt Lake County at the beginning.of each visit and Doug shall be
responsible for picking Hyrum up in Salt Lake County at the end of each visit that
occurs in Salt Lake County and in Colorado at the end of each visit that occurs in
Colorado. The next extended visit after entry of this decree shall commence with
Robin picking-up Hyrum in S 'alt Lake County on March 24, 2005, and end with
Doug picking-up Hyrum in Colorado on April 10; 2005. Doug shall be the payee
between Hyrum and Robin and is ORDERED to maintain a workin
ithin his home that Hyrum may use to call Robin and to receive calls
from Robin. Doug is ORDERED to give Hyrum privacy when he speaks by
telephone with Robin and to neither listen to nor participate in such .phone
conversations, or limit the ability of Robin to include other family members or
.. friends in the calls. Robin is ORDERED to refrain from unreasonably making
telephone calls that are unreasonably lengthy or frequent, giving due regard to.
Hyrum's need to do homework, but if Doug deems Robin's calls to be unreasonable
in length or frequency, he is ORDERED to fully refrain from attempting to limit or
an. any way interfere with the calls, and his sole remedy shall be to try to reasonably
work it out with Robin and, if that is unsuccessful, to approach the court about the
issue, with Robin being given reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be
heard. It is further ORDERED that neither party shall enter the other party's home
without the express permission of that other party and neither party shall use the
occasion of picking-up Hyrum to attempt to engage in lengthy discussions.
8. Until Hyrum reaches eighteen years of age, each parent shall be free to
travel with Hyrum dining that parent's time with Hyrum and, in the event of such
travel, each parent is ORDERED to keep the other parent notified of Hyruni's
whereabouts and to facilitate frequent telephone contact between Hyrum and the
other parent while so traveling. At all times each parent shall keep the other parent
notified of that parent's physical home address and phone number. In the event
either parent is- -
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becomes homeless,
that parent shall immediately surrender the physical custody of Hyrum to the other
parent until such time as that parent is able to provide Hyrum with a home with a
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provisions of this paragraph & apply immediately upon the signing and entry of this
decree.
9. Each year, the parties shall calculate their income taxes both with and
without claiming Hyrum so as to ascertain which partywill .receive the greatest tax
. benefit from claiming Hyrum as a dependent and shall exchange tax information by
March of each year for the tax returns due April 15 of that year. The party who
.will obtain the greatest financial benefit from claiming Hyrum as a dependent shall
claim him for that year and shall promptly pay to the other parent the amount by
which that other parent would have benefited had that parent claiMed Hyrum.
10. Both parties shall be responsible for the reasonable and necessary
medical expenses for Hyrum until he reaches eighteen years of age. Each party
shall reimburse the other party for one-half of such reasonable and necessary
medical expenses actually paid by the other party. Appropriate insurance for
Hyrum's medical expenses shall be purchased and maintained if coverage is or
becomes available at a reasonable cost, with each party responsible for one-half
of such reasonable cost. Each party shall reimburse the other party for one-half of
such reasonable cost actually paid by the other party. In .the event that a financial
_. obligation of one party to the other party under this paragraph 10 remains unpaid,
or any other financial obligation arising under any other provision. of this decree
from one party to the other party remains unpaid, income withholding pursuant to
UCA Title 62A, Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5 is hereby ORDERED by this court.
11. All prior orders in this case ate hereby superseded and vacated.
12. All other matters not addressed herein are dismissed, including but,
not limited to., remaining contentions about preliminary injunctions and contempt,
since the preliminary injunction and all contempt orders are all hereby vacated.'
DATED THIS
	 DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2005.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
A copy hereof was MAILED [prior to signing by the court] to Douglas Patrick
Doyle, 459 E. 2700 South # 6 SLC
	
84. 15, this 26t, day of February, 2005.
•OB +'T s •' .Psar -
ttorni fore -spa dent R*bin Doyle
